We present a formally verified global optimization framework. Given a semialgebraic or transcendental function f and a compact semialgebraic domain K, we use the nonlinear maxplus template approximation algorithm to provide a certified lower bound of f over K. This method allows to bound in a modular way some of the constituents of f by suprema of quadratic forms with a well chosen curvature. Thus, we reduce the initial goal to a hierarchy of semialgebraic optimization problems, solved by sums of squares relaxations. Our implementation tool interleaves semialgebraic approximations with sums of squares witnesses to form certificates. It is interfaced with Coq and thus benefits from the trusted arithmetic available inside the proof assistant. This feature is used to produce, from the certificates, both valid under-approximations and lower bounds for each approximated constituent. The application range for such a tool is widespread; for instance Hales' proof of Kepler's conjecture yields thousands of multivariate transcendental inequalities. We illustrate the performance of our formal framework on some of these inequalities as well as on examples from the global optimization literature.
INTRODUCTION

Problems Involving Computer Assisted Proofs
This work is about one particular combination of secure formal proofs with fast mechanical computations: we want the computer to automatically determine precise numerical bounds of algebraic expressions, while retaining the safety of formal proofs -in our case, the Coq proof system.
On one hand, since their conception, computers have been used as fast calculators, whose speed allows the mathematician to access knowledge which would be out of reach without the machine. On the other hand, it is now common practice since a long while to use the computer as a rigorous censor, which checks the va-lidity of a mathematical development down to its formal steps in a given logical formalism; this is the task of proof systems since the 1960s. Combining these two tasks, as in this work, is more recent.
The programming language provided inside the formalism of Coq can be used in sophisticated ways. In particular, it allows to build decision procedures or perform automatized reasoning, thus to prove classes of propositions in a systematic and efficient fashion. Because this involves formalizing a fragment of the logic in Coq itself, this technique is called computational reflection and was introduced in [BRB95] (see also [BM81] for details about reflection).
The fact that complex computations can also take place inside the proof-system was first used for some proof automation like the successive versions of Coq's ring tactic [Bou97, GM05] to check polynomial equalities (actually we happen to use the current version of this tactic in the present work). Other applications include verifying large numbers' primality [GTW06] , checking witnesses from SAT/SMT solvers [AFG + 11] or hardware verification [PM96] . Recently, proof-checkers embedded with computational features were particularly highlighted by allowing the formal checking of results whose proofs are fundamentally computational, like the four-color theorem [Gon08] or Kepler's conjecture.
Kepler's conjecture is one of the eventual motivations of the present work. It can be stated as follows:
Conjecture 1 (Kepler 1611). The maximal density of sphere packings in three dimensional space is π/ √ 18.
This conjecture has been proved by Thomas Hales 1 .
Theorem 1 (Hales [Hal94, Hal05] ). Kepler's conjecture is true.
One of the chapters of [Hal05] is coauthored by Ferguson. The publication of the proof, one of the "most complicated [...] that has been ever produced", to quote his author 2 , took several years and its verification required "unprecedented" efforts by a team of referees; the difficulty being made worse by the use of mechanical computations interwound with mathematical deductions. The degree of complexity of such a checking has motivated the effort to fully formalize them.
Like the four-color theorem's proof, Hales' proofs thus combines "conventional" mathematical deduction and non-trivial computations. The formalization of this development is an ambitious goal addressed by the Flyspeck project, launched by Hales himself [Hal06] . Note that other problems can be solved by proof assistants but do not rely on mechanical computation. As an example, one can mention the formal proof of the Feit-Thompson Odd Order Theorem [GAA + 13]. Flyspeck also involves the formalization of many mathematical concepts and proofs; but we here do not deal with the "conventional" mathematical part of the project.
Nonlinear Inequalities
Computations are mandatory for at least three kind of tasks in Hales' proof: generation of planar graphs, use of linear programming, and bounding of non-linear · 3
expressions. Details about the two former issues are available in Solovyev's doctoral dissertation [Sol12] .
We here focus on the last issue, namely the formal checking of the correctness of hundreds of nonlinear inequalities. Each of these cases boils down to the computation of a certified lower bound for a real-valued multivariate function f : R n → R over a compact semialgebraic set K ⊂ R n :
In some cases, f will be a multivariate polynomial (polynomial optimization problems (POP)); alternatively, f may belong to the algebra A of semialgebraic functions, which extends multivariate polynomials, obtained through arbitrary compositions of (·)
(semialgebraic optimization problems); finally, in the most general case, f may, in addition, involve transcendental functions (sin, arctan, etc ).
Our aim is twofold:
• The first is automation: we want to design a method that finds sufficiently precise lower bounds for all, or at least a majority of the functions f and domains K occurring in the proof.
• The second, as already stressed above, is certification; meaning that the correctness of each of these bounds must be, eventually, formally provable in a proof system such as Coq.
An additional crucial point is precision. Especially the inequalities of Hales' proof are essentially tight.
However, the application range for formal bounds reaches over many areas, way beyond the proof of Kepler Conjecture. Hence, we are also keen on tackling scalability issues, which arise when one wants to provide coarser lower bounds for optimization problems with a larger number of variables or polynomial inequalities of a higher degree.
Context
There have been a number of related efforts to obtain formal proofs for global optimization.
Lower bounds for POP can be obtained by solving sums of squares (SOS) programs using the numerical output of specialized semidefinite programming (SDP) software [HLL09] . Such techniques rely on hybrid symbolic-numeric certification methods, see Peyrl and Parrilo [PP08] and Kaltofen et al. [KLYZ12] , which in turn allow to produce nonnegativity certificates which can be checked in proof assistants. Related formal frameworks include a decision procedure in Coq, described in [Bes07] as well as in Hol-light [Har07] . Both procedures include a proof-search step to find nonnegativity certificates, which relies on the same OCaml libraries. The procedure in [Bes07] is implemented as a tactic called micromega.
Alternative approaches to SOS are based on formalizing multivariate Bernstein polynomials. This research has been carried out in the thesis of R. Zumkeller [Zum08] and by Munõz and Narkawicz [MN13] in PVS [ORS92] .
Such polynomial optimization methods can be extended to transcendental functions using multivariate polynomial approximation through a semialgebraic relaxation. This requires to be able to also certify the approximation error in order to conclude. MetiTarski [AP10] is a theorem prover that can handle nonlinear inequalities involving special functions such as ln, cos, etc. These univariate transcendental functions (as well as the square root) are approximated by a hierarchy of approximations which are rational functions derived from Taylor or continued fractions expansions (for more details, see Cuyt et al. [CBBH08] ).
The Flyspeck project also employed specific methods to verify nonlinear inequalities. Hales and Solovyev developed a nonlinear verification framework [Sol12, SH13] , mixing OCaml and Hol-light [Har96] procedures to achieve formal Taylor interval approximations. A part of this procedure is informal and aims to provide useful hints such as an appropriate subdivision of the nonlinear inequality box K. The formal part of the procedure uses formalization results related to the multivariate Taylor Theorem (e.g. multivariate Taylor formula with second-order error terms) and formal interval arithmetic. Numerical computations with finite precision floating-point numbers are done in a formal setting within Hol-light, thanks to a careful representation of natural numerals over arbitrary bases (see [SH13] for more details). This formal framework is about 2000∼4000 times slower than an informal procedure (written in C++) performing the same verification.
In [CHJL11] , the authors present a scheme amenable to formalization, which provides certified polynomial approximations of univariate transcendental functions. An upper bound of the approximation error is obtained by using a second approximation polynomial with bounded approximation, error relying on a non-negativity test performed by means of univariate sums of squares. The Flocq library [BM11] formalizes floating-point arithmetic inside Coq. The tactic interval [Mel12] , built on top of Flocq, can simplify inequalities on expressions of real numbers. Our formal framework relies on this tactic for handling univariate transcendental functions. However, inequalities involving multivariate transcendental functions remain typically difficult to solve with interval arithmetic, in particular due to the correlation between arguments of unary functions (e.g. sin, arctan) or binary operations (e.g. +, −, ×, /).
Currently, it takes about 5000 CPU hours to verify all the nonlinear inequalities with formal Taylor interval approximations (developed by the Flyspeck project) in Hol-light. One motivation of the present work is to reduce this total verification time using alternative formal methods. In a previous work, the authors developed an informal framework, built on top of the certified -template based -global optimization method [MAGW, AGMW13a, AGMW13b] . The nonlinear template method is a certification framework, aiming at handling the approximation of transcendental functions and increasing the size of certifiable instances. It combines the ideas of maxplus approximations [FM00, AGL08] and linear templates [SSM05] to reduce the complexity of the semialgebraic approximations. Given a multivariate transcendental function f and a semialgebraic compact set K, one builds lower semialgebraic approximations of f using maxplus approximations (usually a supremum of quadratic forms) choosing a set of control points. In this way, the nonlinear template algorithm builds a hierarchy of semialgebraic relaxations that are solved with SDP.
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Contributions
In this article, we present a formal framework, built on top of this informal method.
The correctness of the bounds for semialgebraic optimization problems can be verified using the interface of this algorithm with the Coq proof assistant. Thus, the certificate search and the proof checking inside Coq are separated, which is common in the so-called sceptical approach [BB02] . There are some more practical difficulties however. When solving semialgebraic optimization problems (e.g. POP), the sums of squares certificates produced by existing tools do not exactly match with the system of polynomial inequalities defining K, because these external tools use limited precision floating point numbers and are thus prone to rounding errors. A certified upper bound of this error is obtained inside the proof assistant. Once the bounding of the error is obtained, the verification of the certificate is performed through an equality check in the ring of polynomials whose coefficients are arbitrary-size rationals. This means that we benefit from efficient arithmetic of these coefficients: the recent implementation of functional modular arithmetic allows to handle arbitrary-size natural numbers [GT06] . Spiwack [Spi06] has modified the virtual machine to handle 31-bits integers natively, so that arithmetic operations are delegated to the CPU. These recent developments made possible to deal with cpu-intensive tasks such as handling the proof checking of SAT traces [AGST10] . Here, it allows to check efficiently the correctness of SOS certificates. Furthermore, this verification for SDP relaxations is combined to deduce the correctness of semialgebraic optimization procedures, which requires in particular to assert that the semialgebraic functions are well-defined. It allows to handle more complex certificates for non-polynomial problems. Finally, the datatype structure of these certificates allows to reconstruct the steps of the nonlinear template optimization algorithm.
The present paper is a followup of [AGMW13a] in which the idea of maxplus approximation of transcendental functions was improved through the use of template abstractions. Here, we develop and detail the formal side of this approach. The present framework provides an automated decision procedure to obtain formal bounds for polynomial and semialgebraic functions over semialgebraic sets. This formalization is associated with the development of Coq libraries within the software package NLCertify (see [Mag14] as well as the software web-page 3 ) and complements the existing libraries of the software, originally written in OCaml.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to formal polynomial optimization. We recall some properties of SDP relaxations for polynomial problems (Section 2.1). In Section 2.2, we outline the conversion of the numerical SOS produced by the SDP solvers into an exact rational certificate. Section 2.3 describes the formal verification of this certificate inside Coq. Section 3 explains how to reduce semialgebraic problems to POP through the Lasserre-Putinar lifting. The structure of the interval enclosure certificates for semialgebraic functions is described in Section 3.1. We remind the principle of the nonlinear maxplus template method in Section 4.2. The interface between this algorithm and the formal framework is presented in Section 4.3. Finally, we demonstrate the scalability of our formal method by certifying bounds of non-linear problems from the global optimization literature as well as non trivial inequalities issued from the Flyspeck project.
FORMAL POLYNOMIAL OPTIMIZATION
We consider the general constrained polynomial optimization problem (POP):
where
We can thus assume, without loss of generality, that the first constraints are precisely box constraints; more precisely, that m 2n and
In practice, such bounds [a, b] are known in advance for all Flyspeck inequalities as well as for other global optimization problems which have been considered here.
Recall that the set of feasible points of an optimization problem is simply the domain over which the optimum is taken, i.e., here, K pop .
Certified Polynomial Optimization using SDP Relaxations
Here, we remind how to cast a POP into an SOS program, which can be in turn written as an SDP. We define the set of polynomials which can be written as a sum of squares
. We set g 0 := 1 and take
). Then, we consider the following hierarchy of SDP relaxations for Problem (2.1), consisting of the optimization problems Q k over the variables (µ, σ 0 , . . . , σ m ):
The integer k is called the SDP relaxation order and sup(Q k ) is the optimal value of
We also use the term Putinar-type certificate since its existence comes from the representation theorem of positive polynomials by Putinar [Put93] .
The sequence of optimal values (sup(Q k )) k k0 is monotonically increasing. Lasserre showed [Las01] that it does converge to f * pop under an additional assumption on the polynomials g 1 , . . . , g m (see [Sch05] for more details). One way to ensure that this assumption is automatically satisfied is to normalize and index the box inequalities as follows (corresponding to the affine transformation
then to add the redundant constraint n − n j=1 x 2 j 0 to the set of constraints. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the inequality constraints of Problem(2.1) satisfy both conditions.
Also note that our current implementation allows to compute lower bounds for POP more efficiently by using a sparse refinement of the hierarchy of SDP relaxations (Q k ) (see [WKKM06] for more details).
Hybrid Symbolic-Numeric Certification
The general scheme is thus quite clear: an external tool, here acting as an oracle, computes the certificate (µ k , σ 0 , . . . , σ m ) and the formal proof essentially boils down to checking the equality
and Coq's ring tactic can typically verify such equalities.
There are practical difficulties however. In practice, we solve the relaxations Q k using SDP solvers (e.g. sdpa [YFN + 10]). Unfortunately, such solvers are implemented using floating-point arithmetic and the solution (µ k , σ 0 , . . . , σ m ) satisfies only approximately the equality constraint in Q k :
More precisely, the optimization problems are formalized in Coq by using rational numbers for the coefficients. In any case, we need to deal with this approximation error.
An elaborate method would be to obtain exact certificates, for instance by the rationalization scheme (rounding and projection algorithm) developed by Peyrl and Parrilo [PP08] , with an improvement of Kaltofen et al. [KLYZ12] . Let us note
the error for the problem Q k . The method of Kaltofen et al. [KLYZ12] consists in applying first Gauss-Newton iterations to refine the approximate SOS certificate, until θ k is less than a given tolerance and then, to apply the algorithm of [PP08] . The number µ k is approximated by a nearby rational number µ k Q µ k and the approximate SOS certificate (σ 0 , . . . , σ m ) is converted to a rational SOS (for more details, see [PP08] ). Then the refined SOS is projected orthogonally to to the set of rational SOS certificates (µ k Q , σ 0 Q , . . . , σ m Q ), which satisfy (exactly) the equality constraint in Q k . This can be done by solving a least squares problem, see [PP08] for more information. Note that when the SOS formulation of the polynomial optimization problem is not strictly feasible, then the rounding and projection algorithm may fail. However, Monniaux and Corbineau proposed a partial workaround for this issue [MC11] . In this way, except in degenerate situations, we arrive at a candidate SOS certificate with rational coefficients, (µ k Q , σ 0 Q , . . . , σ m Q ) from the floating point solution of (Q k ). In our case, we do not use the rounding and projection algorithm of Peyrl and Parrilo; instead we rely on a simpler and cruder scheme. We perform a certain number of operations before handing over the certificate to Coq.
In practice, the SDP solvers solve an optimization problem (equivalent to Q k ) 
The extraction is done with the Lacaml (Linear Algebra with OCaml) library, implementing the Blas/Lapack-interface. The floating-point numbers of the generated certificate are viewed as rationals through the straightforward mapping. Numerical SOS certificates are converted into rational SOS using the function Q.of_float of the Zarith OCaml library, which implements arithmetic and logical operations over arbitrary-precision integers. The floating-point value µ k is also converted into a rational. Then, we compute the (exact) error polynomial:
Now we explain how to provide another, hopefully small, bound for pop . Note that this polynomial can be decomposed as pop (x) = |α| 2k α x α . Fortunately, the coefficients of this polynomial are generally small, which allows us to choose *
Indeed, the box inequalities guaranty that for each x ∈ [0, 1] n :
Finally, we compute the actual exact bound given by the certificate: µ
Note that we could optimize the polynomial pop over [0, 1] n , but it would be as hard as solving the initial POP. Moreover, one would have to consider again some residual polynomial after solving the corresponding SDP relaxation.
A Formal Checker for Polynomial Systems
Following the procedure described in Section 2.2, we extract a rational certificate (µ 
The procedure which checks the equality (2.5) between polynomials and SOS inside Coq relies on computational reflexion. We use the reflexive ring tactic,
by using a so-called "customized" polynomial ring 4 . Given two polynomials p and q, this tactic verifies the polynomial equality "p = q" in two steps. The first step is a normalization of both p and q w.r.t. associativity, commutativity and distributivity, constant propagation and rewriting of monomials. The second step consists in comparing syntactically the results of this normalization.
Given a sequence of polynomial constraints g := [g 1 , . . . , g m ], a lower bound µ − k , an objective polynomial f pop and a POP certificate cert_pop (build with a Putinartype certificate and a polynomial remainder pop ), the fact that a successful check of the certificate entails nonnegativity of the polynomial is formalized by the following correctness lemma:
The way this lemma is stated shows that in our development, we use an environment function env to bind positive integers to polynomial real variables. The function [| · |] env maps a polynomial expression to the carrier type R. The function g_nonneg explicits the conditions by returning the conjunction of propositions [
In the sequel of this section, we describe the data structure and the auxiliary lemmas that allow to define and prove correct_pop.
Encoding Polynomials.
Checking ring equalities between polynomials requires to provide a type of coefficients. In our current setting, we choose bigQ, the type of arbitrary-size rationals. The ring morphism IQR injects rational coefficients into the carrier type R of Coq classical real numbers. For the sequel, we also note:
We use two types of polynomials: PExpr is for uninterpreted ring expressions while PolC is for uninterpreted normalized polynomial expressions: . q(x 1 , . . . , x n−1 ) ). Then (PX p j q) evaluates to px j 1 + q(x 2 , . . . , x n ). Polynomial expressions can be normalized via the procedure norm : PExpr → PolC. We note p 1 ≡ p 2 the boolean equality test between two normal forms p 1 and p 2 .
The procedure checker_pop for SOS certificates relies on the correctness lemma norm_eval:
Lemma norm_eval (p : PExpr ) (q : PolC ) :
Here, the function eval_pol maps a sparse normal form to the carrier type R.
Encoding SOS certificates. We recall that an SOS can be decomposed as
Each σ j is encoded using a finite sequence of tuples composed of an arbitrary-size rational (of type bigQ) and a polynomial (of type PolC). Then, we build Putinar-type certificates m j=0 σ j (x)g j (x) of type cert_putinar, with a finite sequence of tuples, composed of an SOS σ j and a polynomial g j . Finally, we define POP certificates (object of type cert_pop) for Problem 2.1 using a Putinar-type certificate and a polynomial remainder pop . The remainder inequality (2.4) can then be proved by structural induction.
Any certificate c of type cert_putinar can be mapped to a sparse Horner form with the function toPolC function, using the sequences g, λ and the environment env. Since each g j is nonnegative by assumption and each σ j is an SOS, one can verify easily the nonnegativity of a Putinar-type certificate by checking the nonnegativity of each λ element. The boolean function checker_pop verifies that:
(1) each element of λ is nonnegative (2) norm(f pop − µ sequence λ to deduce that eval_pol env (toPolC g λ sos)
0. The nonnegativity of eval_pol env ( pop − [lower_bound_0_1 pop ]) comes from inequality (2.4).
We also define the type cert_pop_itv of formal interval bounds certificates for polynomials expressions:
Definition cert_pop_itv := ( cert_pop * cert_pop ) .
Lemma correct_pop_itv relates interval enclosure of polynomials with certificates of type cert_pop_itv:
Here, itv refers to the type of intervals, encoded using two rational coefficients:
Inductive itv : Type := Itv : bigQ → bigQ → itv . Definition itv01 := Itv 0 1. ( * t h e i n t e r v a l [0, 1] * )
Moreover, we denote the lower (resp. upper) bound of an interval i by i (resp. i).
Experimental Results
We first recall some Flyspeck related definitions [Hal03] :
We tested our formal verification procedure on the following polynomial problems, occurring as sub-problems of Flyspeck nonlinear inequalities: A preliminary phase consists in scaling the POP to apply the correctness Lemma correct_itv. Table I shows some comparison results with the micromega tactic, available inside Coq. While performing the proof-search step, the tactic relies on the external SDP solver Csdp. This solver is used to solve another SDP relaxation that is more general than Q k (Stengle Positivstellensatz [Ste74] ) to find witnesses of unfeasibility of a set of polynomial constraints (see [Bes07] for more details).
To deal with the numerical errors of Csdp, the proof-search (OCaml libraries) also includes a projection algorithm, which is is performed in such a way that pop = 0. Thus, the procedure returns a rational SOS certificate that matches exactly f pop −μ k , so that the proof-checking consists only in verifying a polynomial equality. Numerical experiments are performed using the Coq proof scripts of our formalization (available in the NLCertify 5 software package), on an Intel Core i5 CPU (2.40 GHz). For the timings related to NLCertify, the column "t i " refers to the time spent to find the SOS certificates "externally" (while solving SDP relaxations and extracting SOS certificates in OCaml) and the column "t f " refers to the total verification time (while compiling Coq proof scripts) 6 . Notice that for POP2, we consider the projection of ∆x with respect to the first n coordinates on the box K (fixing the other variables to 6.3504). Table I indicates that our tool outperforms the micromega decision procedure, thanks to the sparse variant of relaxation Q k and a simpler projection method. The symbol "-" means that the inequality could not be checked by micromega within one hour of computation. Problems occur while performing the proof-search step of micromega, as either the projection algorithm fails or the computational cost of the SDP relaxation is too demanding. 
FORMAL SEMIALGEBRAIC OPTIMIZATION
We can now build on the work of the previous section in order to extend the framework to obtain also formal bounds for semialgebraic optimization problems:
where f sa ∈ A and K := {x ∈ R n : g 1 (x) 0, . . . , g m (x) 0} is a basic semialgebraic set such that the constraints (g j ) satisfy (2.2). For the sake of clarity, we explicit only the subset of A consisting of arbitrary composition of polynomials with √ ·, +, −, ×, /, whenever these operations are well-defined (neither division by zero nor square root of negative value occur). However, we can deal with the case f sa = max(f 1 , f 2 ) by using the identity: 2 max(f 1 , f 2 ) = f 1 + f 2 + (f 1 − f 2 ) 2 . Similar identities exist to handle operations such as min(·, ·), | · |.
The function f sa has a basic semialgebraic lifting; this means that one adds new "lifting variables" in order to get rid of the non-polynomial functions in f sa thus reducing the problem to a POP (for more details, see e.g. [LP10] ). More precisely, we can add auxiliary variables x n+1 , . . . , x n+p (lifting variables), and construct polynomials h 1 , . . . , h s ∈ R[x 1 , . . . , x n+p ] defining the semialgebraic set:
such that f * pop := inf{x n+p : (x 1 , . . . , x n+p ) ∈ K pop } is a lower bound of f * sa . Now, we explain how to implement this procedure in a formal setting.
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Data Structure for Semialgebraic Certificates
The inductive type cert_sa represents interval bounds certificates for semialgebraic optimization problems:
Note that the constructor Poly takes a type PExpr object as argument to represent the polynomial components of the function f sa . The other constructors correspond to the various ways of building elements of A. Even though this certificate data-structure may look heavy-weighted, all constructors are required for verification purpose: for instance Fadd is mandatory to check the nonnegativity of a function such as √ p + q, for polynomials p and q. Each constructor takes a formal interval bound i and a certificate c of type cert_pop_itv (as defined in section 2) as arguments. In the sequel, we explain how to ensure that i is a valid interval enclosure of f sa by checking the correctness of c.
Example 2 (from Lemma 9922699028 Flyspeck). From the two multivariate polynomials p(x) := ∂ 4 ∆x and q(x) := 4x 1 ∆x, we define the semialgebraic function r(
2 ]. Using the procedure described in Section 2, one obtains a formal interval i p (resp. i q ) enclosing the range of p (resp. q), certified by an SOS certificate c p (resp. c q ). We also derive an interval enclosure The SOS certificate c r allows to prove that i r is a correct interval enclosure of r.
The interpretation of cert_sa objects is straightforward, using the evaluation procedure for polynomial expressions. Thus, we also note [|f |] env the interpretation of the semialgebraic certificate f , which returns the expression of the semialgebraic function f sa . A procedure n lifting returns the index v of the lifting variable which represents f sa . When f sa is a polynomial, n lifting returns the number of variables involved in f sa . The value is incremented when f sa is either a division or a square root.
Then, two procedures are mandatory to reduce Problem (3.1) into a polynomial optimization problem min x∈Kpop f pop . The function obj derives the objective polynomial f pop , while cstr returns a list of polynomials (h l ) defining K pop .
Fixpoint obj
f v : PExpr := match f with | Poly p_ _ =⇒ p | Fopp q _ =⇒ -( obj q v ) | Fadd f 1 f 2 _ _ =⇒ ( obj f 1 v ) + ( obj f 2 (n lifting f 1 v ) ) | Fmul f 1 f 2 _ _ =⇒ ( obj f 1 v ) * ( obj f 2 (n lifting f 1 v ) ) | Fsub f 1 f 2 _ _ =⇒ ( obj f 1 v ) -( obj f 2 (n lifting f 1 v ) ) | Fdiv f 1 f 2 i _ =⇒ scale_obj ( PEX (n lifting f 2 (n lifting f 1 v ) + 1) ) i | Fsqrt q i =⇒ scale_obj ( PEX (n lifting q v + 1) ) i end .
Given a polynomial p and an interval
Example 3. Applying the function n lifting to the six dimensional functions q and r of Example 2 yields n lifting sqrtq = 7 and n lifting r = 8. Then, obj sqrtq returns the polynomial (M 7 −m 7 ) x 7 +m 7 and obj r returns 
Formal Interval Bounds for Semialgebraic Functions
Now, we introduce the function checker_sa built on top of checker_pop_itv, which checks recursively the correctness of certificates for semialgebraic functions. 
Recall that our goal is to prove the correctness of a lower bound µ − of min x∈K f sa (x) (resp. an upper bound µ + of max x∈K f sa (x)). Then, one can apply the following correctness lemma to state that the interval i := [µ − , µ + ] (returned by itv f ) is a valid enclosure of f sa over K whenever one succeeds to check the certificate f .
Proof. By induction over the structure of semialgebraic expressions. The corresponding proof script is available in the NLCertify package 7 .
CERTIFIED BOUNDS FOR MULTIVARIATE TRANSCENDENTAL FUNCTIONS
We now consider an instance of Problem (1.1). We identify the objective function f with its abstract syntax tree t, whose leaves are semialgebraic functions (see Section 3) and other nodes are either basic binary operations (+, ×, −, /) or belong to the set D of unary transcendental functions (sin, etc ). We first recall how to handle these unary functions using maxplus approximations. 
Maxplus Approximations for Univariate Semiconvex Transcendental Functions
We consider transcendental functions which are twice differentiable. Thus, the restriction of r ∈ D to any closed interval I is γ-semiconvex for a sufficiently large γ, i.e. the univariate function g := r + γ 2 | · | 2 is convex on I (for more details on maxplus approximation, we refer the interested reader to [AGK05, McE06] ). Using the convexity of g, one can always find a constant γ sup b∈I −r (b) such that for all b i ∈ I: 
The Nonlinear Maxplus Template Method
Our main algorithm template_approx (Figure 2 ) is based on a previous method of the authors [MAGW] , in which the objective function is bounded by means of semialgebraic functions. For the sake of completeness, we first recall the basic principles of this method.
Given a function represented by an abstract tree t, semialgebraic lower and upper approximations t − and t + are computed by induction. If the tree is reduced to a leaf, i.e. t ∈ A, we set t − = t + := t. If the root of the tree corresponds to a binary At the end (Line 11), we call the function min_sa (resp. max_sa) which determines lower (resp. upper) bounds of the approximation t − (resp. t + ) using techniques presented in Section 3.
Input: tree t, semialgebraic set K, finite sequence of control points s Output: lower bound m, upper bound M , lower semialgebraic approximation t − , upper semialgebraic approximation t + 1: if t ∈ A then t − := t, t + := t 2: else if bop := root(t) is a binary operation with children c 1 and c 2 then 3: 
Formal Verification of Semialgebraic Relaxations
The correctness of the semialgebraic maxplus approximations for univariate functions (computed by the build_par procedure, see Figure 2 at Line 8) is ensured with the interval 8 tactic [Mel12] , available inside Coq. As detailed in Section 3.2, the procedure checker_sa validates the interval bounds for semialgebraic problems obtained with the functions min_sa and max_sa (see Figure 2 at Line 11). Table II presents the results obtained when proving the correctness of lower bounds for semialgebraic relaxations of two 6-variables Flyspeck inequalities. When the bounds obtained with the algorithm template_approx are too coarse to certify a given inequality, we perform a branch and bound procedure over the domain K. We refer to #boxes as the total number of domain cuts that are mandatory to prove the inequality. As for Table I, the time t i refers to the informal verification time, required to construct the certificates for semialgebraic functions, while using the optimization algorithm without any call to the Coq libraries. The total verification time t f is then compared with t i . Here, the formal verification of SOS certificates is the bottleneck of the computational certification task. Indeed, it is 8.5 (resp. 9.4) times slower to prove the correctness of semialgebraic lower bounds for the first (resp. second) inequality. For both inequalities, it takes about 7% of the total time to compute bounds with SDP. Note that half this time is spent to compute negative bounds which are not formally verified afterwards. Such non trivial inequalities are also used as test cases for the formal techniques employed by the Flyspeck project (see the row corresponding to the inequality 3318775219 in Table 2 of [SH13] ) and it takes about the same amount of CPU time to verify them with both methods. For comparison purpose, notice that this ratio between formal and informal verification does not exceed 10 in our case, while it is about 2000∼4000 in [SH13] . Also, as mentioned in [MAGW] , the number of subdivisions is much smaller than for methods using interval Taylor approximation (9370 for the first inequality and 25994 for the second one 9 ), due to the precision of SOS-based methods. Table III presents 9 The data come from the benchmarks file available at http://code.google.com/p/flyspeck/ source/browse/trunk/informal_code/interval_code/qed_log_2012.txt. The file indicates the number of subdivisions (denoted by "cells") for each inequality while running informal verification in C++ with interval arithmetic and directed rounding. 10 the file coq/mccertif.v in the archive at https://forge.ocamlcore.org/frs/?group_id=351
